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THE DOCTRINES OF NULIFICATION AND SECESSIONA HISTORICAL STUDY
HowAR

NxWCOmB MosE.*

Interposition or nullification is the non-recognition of the validity
of federal law by the people, the Governor, the legislature, or the
judiciary of a State, the recognition of the consequent non-amendability of the people of the State to such federal law, and the rendering inoperative of such federal law within the State by non-compliance
with such federal law on the part of the people, the Governor, the
legislature, or the judiciary of the State.
President John Quincy Adams was of the opinion that, "'... the
people of a state ... have delegated no such power (the power to
nullify federal law) to their legislatures or their judges".' He was
silent as regards whether the people of a State have delegated such
power to their Governor.
He thought that the people of a State alone might legitimately exercise such power as they possessed it as one of their residual powers
(unless they had delegated it to their Governor). However, he considered that whenever such power is exercised, "... . they (the people
of a State) do thereby declare themselves and their State quoad hoc
out of the pale of the Union". Therefore, to him the immediate and
inevitable corollary to interposition was secession.
Secession is the re-assumption by the people of a State of the
powers they had delegated to the United States. Nullification is a
re-assumption of one or several of such powers, but secession is a
complete re-assumption of all such powers. By virtue of interposition a State is an equal partner in the Union in all respects except
those touching upon the federal law which the people, the Governor,
the legislature, or the judiciary of the State have nullified. By virtue of secession a State is without the Union and a complete, independent, and sovereign nation. Secession can be effectuated, not by
the Governor, the legislature, or the judiciary of a State, but only
by the people of the State since the powers to be re-assumed had
0
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1. Piresident John Quincy Adams' Letter of December 30, 1828 in Correspondence Between John Quincy Adams, Esquire, President of the United States,
and Several Citizens of Massachusetts Concerning the Charge of a Design to
Dissolve the Union Alleged to Have Existed in That State, Press of the Boston
Daily Advertiser, Boston 1829, pp. 32, 33.
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been delegated to the United States by the people of the State in
* accordance with the expressed terms of the Constitution of the United
States.2 The people of a State may nullify federal law by themselves at a referendum or through special agents called delegates in
convention. The former mode of action is more democratic inasmuch as the people perform the task themselves rather than commit
it to the trust of only a few of their number.
The first instance of State interposition in American history was
by Georgia through her executive department (her Governor and her
Attorney General) in 1794 against a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States, Chisholm v. Georgia. 3 This instance of nullification was adequately described in 1854 by Mr. Justice Benning of
the Supreme Court of Georgia in his opinion in Padelford v. The
Mayor of Savannah 4 as follows:
"The first Act of Georgia, to which I shall refer, will be her
denial of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of the United States, in
a case which was brought against her in that Court. It was the case
of Chisholm, Ex'r, against Georgia.
" 'This action was instituted in August Term, 1792. On the
11th day of July, 1792, the Marshall, for the District of Georgia,
made the following return: Executed as within commanded; that
is to say, served a copy thereof, on His Excellency, Edward
Telfair, Esq. Governor of the State of Georgia, and one other
copy on Thomas P. Carnes, Esq. the Attorney General of said

State.
Robert Forsyth, Marshall'."
"Georgia did not appear in the case. The plaintiff then moved,
that unless the State, after reasonable notice of that motion, should
cause an appearance to be entered for her, or show cause to the contrary, judgment should be entered against her, and a Writ of Enquiry of Damages be awarded.
"Ingersoll and Dallas presented a written remonstrance and protestation, on behalf of the State, against the exercise of Jurisdiction
in the cause; but in consequence of positive instructions,they declined
taking any part in arguing the question. (2 Dali. 419.)
"It was argued by the Counsel for the plaintiff. The Judges were
not unanimous in opinion. The majority, consisting of Jay, C. J. Wilson, Blair and Cushing, Justices, held that the court had jurisdiction.
2. U. S. Co-NsT. Art. VII.

3. 2 Dall. 419, 1 S. Ct. 16 (1793).
4. 14 Ga. 438, 478-480 (1854).
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Justice Iredell, in a very able opinion dissented and held that a State
could not be sued.
"The ground upon which the majority put their decision was, the
words of the Constitution - 'The Judicial power of the United States
shall extend to controversies between a State, and citizens of another
State'. The Chief Justice says, 'It is contended that this ought to
reach none of those controversies, excepting those in which a State
may be plaintiff'. But in answer to that he maintains, first, that the
words are to be construed liberally, as they are remedial. Then he
says, 'If we attend to the words, we find them to be express, positive,
free from ambiguity, and without room for such implied expressions'
(exceptions). (Ibid, 476.)
"So the Court 'Ordered, that unless the said State shall either in
due form appear, or show cause to the contrary, in this Court, by
the first day of next Term, judgment, by default, shall be entered
against the said State'. The reporter adds, in a note, that 'In February Term, 1794, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and a writ
of Enquiry awarded. The writ, however, was not sued out and executed; so that this cause, and all of the other suits against States,
were swept, at once, from the records of the Court, by the amendment of the Federal Constitution'. (Ibid, 480.)
"Georgia treated the Court with contempt, in respect to this case.
Her position was, that the court had no jurisdiction of her as a party.
Georgia maintained that the words 'The Judicial power of the United
States, shall extend to controversies between a State and citizens of
another State', were not to be construed to extend to controversies
in which a State might be defendant; but only to those in which
a State might be plaintiff - why? obviously because: 1. It is not
expressly said in those words, that the power shall extend to controversies in which a State may be defendant, and in the opinion of
Georgia, no department of the General Government had any power
but such as was expressly given it in the Constitution.
"2. Because, even if it is, in these words, expressly said that the
power shall extend to controversies, in which a State may be defendant, yet these words admit of another and a narrower meaning,
namely, one which restricts the power to controversies in which a
State may be the plaintiff. And they ought to be held to have that
meaning, as in the opinion of Georgia even express grants of power
in the Constitution, ought to be construed, with the utmost strictness.
"Georgia, then, in this case, which happened in 1792, three or
only four years after the adoption of the Constitution, held that no
power was given by the Constitution, but what was expressly given;
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and that what was expressly given, was to be construed strictly. It is
true, this position of her's was taken in reference only to a single
power - a Judicial power. But the reasons of the position are
general. To be applicable to the particular power in the case, they
have to be large enough to be equally applicable to all of the other
powers delegated in the Constitution.
"Now in this position, Georgia triumphed."
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky on
November 16, 1798 threatened the invocation of interposition in consequence of the Federal Naturalization Act5 of June 18, 1798, Alien
Act8 of June 25, 1798, Alien Enemies Act7 of July 6, 1798, and Sedition Act8 of July 14, 1798 by passing a resolution written by Thomas
Jefferson declaring: "Resolved, that the several States composing
the United States of America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government; but that by compact
under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States,
and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general government
for special purposes, delegated to that government definite powers, reserving each State to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own
self-government; and that whensoever the general government assumes
undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no
force; that to this compact each State acceded as a State, and is an
integral party; that this government, created by this compact, was not
made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated
to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the
Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that, as in all other cases
of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has
an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode
and measure of redress." 9 The last seventy-seven words were contained in a resolution passed by the General Assembly of the State
of Wisconsin in protest against the decision by Mr. Chief Justice Taney
of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1859 in the case of
Ableman v. Booth. 10 Included in the original project by Jefferson
was the following statement: "Where powers are assumed (by the
Federal Government) which have not been delegated, a nullification
of the act is the rightful remedy; but every State has a natural right
in cases not within the contract (casus non foederis) to nullify of
5. 1 U. S. STAT. AT LARGE, p. 566.
6. 1 U. S. STAT. AT LARGE, p. 570.
7. 1 U. S. STAT. AT LARGE, p. 577.
8. 1 U. S. STAT. AT LARGE, pp. 596-7.

9. N. S. Shaler, Kentucky, p. 409.
10. 21 How. 506, 16 L. Ed. 169 (1859).
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their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their
limits".
Later that same year (December 24, 1798) the General Assembly
of the Commonwealth of Virginia made a similar threat of nullification by passing a resolution written by James Madison declaring:
"That this assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that
it views the powers of the Federal government, as resulting from the
compact to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense
and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no
farther valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated, in that
compact; and that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous
exercise of other powers, not granted by said compact, the States,
who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to
interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining
within their respective limits the authorities" 1 rights, and liberties
appertaining to them."
The second and only other time that the actual word "interpose"
was used in referring to the doctrine of nullification or interposition
was by Mr. Justice Smith of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
1854 in his opinion in the case of. In Re Booth 12 nullifying the Federal
Fugitive Slave Act' 3 of September 18, 1850, in which decision he
made the following statement: "At least, such shall not become the
degradation of Wisconsin, without meeting as stern remonstrance and
resistance as I may be able to interpose so long as her people impose
upon me the duty of guarding their rights and liberties, and of
maintaining the dignity and sovereignty of their State".
The following year (February 22, 1799) the General Assembly of
Kentucky passed another resolution threatening nullification in the
following words: "That the several States who formed that instrument (The Constitution of the United States) being sovereign and
independent have the unquestionable right to judge of the infraction;
and that a nullification by these sovereignties of all unauthorized acts
14
done under color of that instrument is the rightful remedy".
The General Assembly of the State of South Carolina threatened
the exercise of interposition on December 19, 1828 against the Federal Tariff Act of May 20, 1828 by passing the following resolution of
protestation: ". . . the representatives of the good people of this
commonwealth, anxiously desiring to live in peace with their fellow11.
12.
13.
14.

VA. STAT. AT LA nc (Nzw Szums), vol. 11 1796-1802, pp. 191-194.
3 Wis. 13, 134, (1854).
9 U. S. STAT'. AT LARGE 462.
EBuor's DxmAT-5, 1861, vol. IV, p. 544.
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citizens, and to do all that in them lies to preserve and perpetuate the
union of the states, and liberties of which it is the surest pledge, but
feeling it to be their bounden duty to expose and resist all encroachments upon the true spirit of the Constitution, lest an apparent acquiescence in the system of protecting duties should be drawn into
precedent - do, in the name of the commonwealth of South Carolina,
claim to enter upon the Journal of the Senate their protest against
it as unconstitutional, oppressive, and unjust".' 5
In January, 1832 in the case of Worcester v. Georgia' 0 Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court of the United States stated
in his opinion that: ". . . it is the opinion of this court that the
act 17 (of December 19, 1829) of the legislature of the State of
Georgia upon which the indictment in this case is founded, is contrary to the Constitution, treaties, and laws' 8 of the United States
..that the judgment rendered inf the premises, by the said superior
court of Georgia, upon the verdict upon the plea of not guilty afterwards pleaded by the said Samuel A. Worcester, whereby the said
Samuel A. Worcester is sentenced to hard labor in the penitentiary
of the State of Georgia, ought to be reversed and annulled . . . that
all proceedings on the said indictment do forever surcease; and that
the said Samuel A. Worcester be, and hereby is henceforth dismissed
therefrom, and that he go thereof quit without day. And that a
special mandate do go from this court, to the said superior court,
to carry this judgment into execution...
"In the case of Butler, Plaintiff in Error, v. The State of Georgia,' 9
the same judgment was given by the court, and a special mandate was
ordered from the court to the superior court of Gwinnett County, to
carry the judgment into execution."
As stated in the second note by Colonel Vilas of the Milwaukee Bar
adopted by Mr. Chief Justice Dixon of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin as expressing the views of the Chief Justice in the case of
Ableman v. Booth 2 ° in 1859, the Superior Court of Gwinnett County,
Georgia ". . . refused to certify the records, and afterwards . . . refused to obey the mandates upon the judgments of the Supreme
Court of the United States, reversing the judgments of the State
Court".
15. ELLoT's DEBATES, 1861, vol. IV, p. 580.
16. 6 Pet. 515, 597 (1832).
17. GA. AcTs 1829, pp. 98-101.
18. U. S. STATUTE OF 1802, 2 U. S. StAT. AT LARGE 139; U. S. STATUTE oF
1819, 3 U. S. STAT. AT LARGE 516.
19. 6 Pet. 597 (1832).
20. 11 Wis. 517, 550 (1859).
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The people of the State of South Carolina nullified the Federal
Tariff Acts of May 20, 1828 and of July 14, 1832 by their Ordinance
of Nullification passed by convention on November 24, 1832 and ratified by the people at a referendum on December 20, 1832. Thus, interposition by South Carolina was accomplished by the most democratic method which exists. The Nullification Ordinance read as
follows: "We, therefore, the people of the State of South Carolina
in Convention assembled, do declare and ordain ... That the several
acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities .. .and, more especially, . . . (the
tariff acts of 1828 and 1832) .. .are unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent
thereof, and are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State,
its officers or citizens; and all promises, contracts, and obligations,
made or entered into, or to be made or entered into, with purpose to
secure the dties imposed by the said acts, and all judicial proceedings which shall be hereafter had in affirmance thereof, are and shall
be held utterly null and void ...
And we, the People of South Carolina, to the end that it may be
fully understood by the Government of the United States, and the
people of the co-States, that we are determined to maintain this, our
Ordinance and Declaration, at every hazard, Do Further Declare
that we will not submit to the application of force, on the part of the
Federal Government, to reduce this State to obedience; but that we
will consider the passage, by Congress of any act .. . to coerce the
State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the acts hereby declared to be null and void, otherwise than
through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the
longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union: and that, the
people of this State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from
all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection
with the people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to
organize a separate Government, and do all other acts and things
21
which sovereign and independent States may of right to do".
The people of the State of South Carolina invoked interposition
on March 18, 1833 against the Federal Tariff Act of March 2, 1833
by enacting in convention the following resolution: "We the People
of the State of South Carolina in Convention assembled, do Declare
and Ordain, that the Act of the Congress of the United States, en21. S. C. STAT. 1832, vol. I, p. 329.
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titled 'An Act further to provide for the collection of duties on imports,' approved the second day of March, 1833, is unauthorized by
the Constitution of the United States, subversive of that Constitution,
and destructive of public liberty; and that the same is, and shall be
22
deemed, null and void, within the limits of this State".
. "Plucky little South Carolina was very much aggrieved over the
tariff act of 1828 . . . I say plucky South Carolina, for the reason
that she furnished as many soldiers for the Revolutionary war as all
the New England States together. At the time South Carolina was
having this trouble in '32 and '33, Massachusetts took down from
her State House the U. S. flag, and publicly said that it should not
wave over them longer."2 3
The General Assembly of the State of South Carolina in anticipation, threatened to levy nullification against two possible federal
statutes by passing the following resolutions on December 16, 1835:
"6. Resolved, That we should consider the abolition of slavery in the
District of Columbia, as a violation of the rights of the citizens of
that District, derived from the implied conditions on which that territory was ceded to the general government, and as an usurpation to
be at once resisted as nothing more than the commencement of a
scheme of much more extensive and flagrant injustice.
7. Resolved, That the legislature of South Carolina, regards with
decided approbation, the measures of security adopted by the Post
Office Department of the United States, in relation to the transmission of incendiary tracts. But if this highly essential and protective
policy, be counteracted by congress, and the United States mail becomes a vehicle for the transmission of the mischievous documents,
with which it was recently freighted, we, in this contingency, expect
that the Chief Magistrate of our State, will forthwith call the legislature together, that timely measures may be taken to prevent its
'2 4
traversing our territory.
The Federal Fugitive Slave Law2 5 was enacted by the Congress
in 1793 to effectuate the following provision of the Constitution of
the United States, "No Person held to Service or Labour in one
State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered upon claim of the Party to
22.
23.
24.
25.

S. C. STAT. 1833, vol. I, pp. 400-01.
Stonebraker, J. Clarence, The Unwritten South, 6th ed., 1908, p. 51.
S. C. ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS 1835, p. 26.
1 U. S. STAT.AT LARGn 302.
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whom such Service or Labour may be due". 26 The General Court
of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted a statute in 1843
nullifying the Federal Fugitive Slave Act. The law provided as follows:
"Sect. 1. No judge of any court of record of this Commonwealth,
and no justice of the peace, shall hereafter take cognizance or grant
a certificate in cases that may arise under the third section of an act
of Congress, passed February twelfth, seventeen hundred and ninetythree, and entitled 'an Act respecting fugitives from justice and persons escaping from the service of their masters,' to any person who
claims any other person as a fugitive slave within the jurisdiction of
the Commonwealth.
Sect. 2. No sheriff, deputy-sheriff, coroner, constable, jailer, or
other officer of this Commonwealth, shall hereafter arrest or detain,
or aid in the arrest or detention or imprisonment in any jail or other
building belonging to this Commonwealth, or to any county, city or
town thereof, of any person for the reason that he is claimed as a
fugitive slave.
Sect. 3. Any justice of the peace, sheriff, deputy-sheriff, coroner,
constable, or jailer, who shall offend against the provisions of this
law, by in any way acting directly or indirectly under the power conferred by the third section of the act of Congress, afore-mentioned,
shall forfeit a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars for every
such offense, to the use of the county where said offense is committed,
or shall be subject to imprisonment not exceeding one year in the
27
county jail."1
The foregoing statute was passed in consequence of the not-sosubtle advice of one of her native sons, Mr. Justice Story, presumptuously rendered in the case of Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 2 8 the preceding year in the following words: "As to the
authority so conferred upon State magistrates, while a difference of
opinion has existed, and may exist still on the point, in different
States, whether State magistrates are bound to act under it (the Federal Fugitive Slave Law of 1793), none is entertained by this Court,
that State magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that authority,
unless prohibited by State legislation".
This was not the first time that Mr. Justice Story went outside the
26. U. S. CoNsT., Art. IV, sec. 3.
27. MAss. AcTs AND REsoLvEs 1843-44,
28. 16 Pet. 539, 622 (1842).
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record to render a dose of unsolicited legal advice in one of his official opinions while holding the public office of an Associate Justice
of. the Supreme Court of the United States. In 1819 the Supreme
Court decided the famous case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,2 9 which held corporate charters to constitute irrevocable
contracts binding upon the States issuing them. In that case Mr.
Justice Story showed the States a way out by observing in his concurring opinion that the States in granting corporate charters might
reserve to themselves the power to amend, alter, or repeal such charters and that such reservation of power clauses must be held to be
part of the contracts.
The same year (1843) that the General Court of Massachusetts
took the foregoing action, the General Assembly of the State of Vermont enacted a law on November 1st, also interposing against the
Federal Fugitive Slave Law. The Vermont statute provided as follows:
"Sect. 1. No court of record in this state, nor any judge thereof,
no justice of the peace nor other magistrate, acting under the authority of this state, shall hereafter take cognizance of, or grant any certificate, warrant, or other process, in any case arising under section
three of an act of Congress, passed February twelfth, seventeen hundred and ninety-three, entitled 'an act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters,' to any
person claiming any other person as a fugitive slave, in this state.
"Sect. 2. No sheriff, deputy sheriff, high bailiff, constable, jailer,
or other officer or citizen of this state shall, hereafter, seize, arrest,
or detain, or aid in the seizure, arrest or detention, or imprisonment
in any jail or other building, belonging to this State, or to any county,
town, city, or person therein, of any person for the reason that he
is or may be claimed as a fugitive slave.
"Sect. 3. No sheriff, deputy sheriff, high bailiff, constable, or
other officer or citizen of this state, shall transport, or remove, or
4id or assist in the transportation or removal of any fugitive slave, or
any person claimed as such, from any place in this state to any other
place within or without the same.
"Sect. 4. If any such judge, justice of the peace, magistrate, officer
or citizen, shall offend against the peace, magistrate, officer or citizen,
shall be subject to the penalties provided in section five of this act.
29. 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819).
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"Sect. 5. Any judge of any court of record in this state, any justice of the peace or other magistrate, any sheriff, deputy sheriff, high
bailiff, constable, or jailer, or any citizen of this state, who shall offend against the provisions of this act, by acting directly or indirectly under the provisions of section three of the act of Congress aforesaid, shall forfeit a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, to the
use of the state, to be recovered upon information or indictment, or
be imprisoned in the state prison not exceeding five years." 30
The Congress on September 18, 1850 amended the Federal Fugitive Slave Law so as to better effectuate the provision of the Constitution of the United States pertaining to the rendition of fugitive
slaves by stipulating as follows:

".

.

. the better to enable the said

commissioners, when thus appointed, to execute their duties faithfully and efficiently, in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution of the United States and of this act, they are hereby authorized and empowered, within their counties respectively, to appoint,
...any one or more suitable persons, from time to time, to execute
all such warrants and other process as may be issued by them in the
lawful performance of their respective duties; with authority to such
commissioners, or the persons to be appointed by them, to execute process as aforesaid, to summon and call to their aid the bystanders, or
posse conmitatus of the proper county, when necessary to ensure a faithful observance of the clause of the Constitution referred to, in conformity with the provisions of this act; and all good citizens are hereby commanded to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution
of this law, whenever their services may be required, as aforesaid,
for that purpose; and said warrants shall run, and be executed by
said officers, anywhere in the State within which they are issued".
The General Court of Massachusetts on May 21, 1855 nullified the
foregoing Federal Fugitive Slave Law of September 18, 1850 by enacting a statute providing as follows:
"Sect. 7. If any person shall remove from the limits of this Commonwealth, or shall assist in removing therefrom, or shall come into
the Commonwealth with the intention of removing or of assisting in
the removing therefrom, or shall procure or assist in procuring to be
so removed, any person being in the peace thereof who is not 'held
to service or labor' by the 'party' making 'claim,' or who has not
'escaped' from the 'party' making 'claim,' within the meaning of those
words in the Constitution of the United States, on the pretense that
such person is so held or has so escaped, or that his 'service or labor'
30. VT.AcTs 1843, pp. 11-12.
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is so 'due,' or with the intent to subject him to such 'service or labor,'
he shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand, nor more
than five thousand dollars, and by imprisonment in the State Prison
not less than one, nor more than five years...
"Sect. 9. No person, while holding any office of honor, trust, or
emolument, under the laws of this Commonwealth, shall, in any capacity, issue any warrant or other process, or grant any certificate,
under or by virtue of an act of congress (February 12, 1793) . . .
or under or by virtue of an act of congress (September 18, 1850) ...
or shall in any capacity, serve any such warrant or other process.
"Sect. 10. Any person who shall grant any certificate under or
by virtue of the acts of congress, mentioned in the preceding section,
shall be deemed to have resigned any commission from the Commonwealth which he may possess, his office shall be deemed vacant, and
he shall be forever thereafter ineligible to any office of trust, honor
or emolument under the laws of this Commonwealth.
"Sect. 11. Any person who shall act as counsel or attorney for
any claimant of any alleged fugitive from service or labor, under or
by virtue of the acts of congress mentioned in the ninth section of
this act, shall be deemed to have reqigned any commission from the
Commonwealth that he may possess, and he shall be thereafter incapacitated from appearing as counsel or attorney in the courts of
this Commonwealth.
"Sect. 14. Any person holding any judicial office under the constitution or laws of this Commonwealth, who shall continue, for ten
days after the passage of this act, to hold the office of United States
commissioner, or any office... which qualifies him to issue any warrant or other process .. . under the (Fugitive Slave Acts) shall be
deemed to have violated good behavior, to have given reason for the
loss of public confidence, and furnished sufficient ground either for
impeachment or for removal by address.
"Sect. 15. Any sheriff, deputy sheriff, jailer, coroner, constable,
or other officer of this Commonwealth, or the police of any city or
town, or any district, county, city or town officer, or any officer or
other member of the volunteer militia of this Commonwealth, who
shall hereafter arrest ... any person for the reason that he is claimed
or adjudged to be a fugitive from service or labor, shall be punished
by fine . . . and by imprisonment . .
"Sect. 16. The volunteer militia of the Commonwealth shall not
act in any manner in the seizure . . . of any person for the reason
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that he is claimed or adjudged to be a fugitive from service or
labor...
"Sect. 19. No jail, prison, or other place of confinement belonging to, or used by, either the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or any
county therein, shall be used for the detention or imprisonment of
any person accused or convicted of any offense created by (the
Federal Fugitive Slave Acts) . .. or accused or convicted of obstructing or resisting any process, warrant, or order issued under
either of said acts, or of rescuing or attempting to rescue, any person arrested or detained under any of the provisions of either of the
said acts." 31
Thus, twice has Massachusetts nullified a United States statute,
first in 1843 and then in 1855, although twice previously she threatened such action in the form of resolutions passed by her General
Court, first on June 20, 180432 disapproving of the acquisition of
Louisiana and then on February 22, 1845 disapproving of the annexation of Texas. The latter resolution read as follows:
"Resolved, That Massachusetts has never delegated the power to
admit into the Union, States or Territories without or beyond the
original territory of the States and Territories belonging to the Union
at the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. And that,
in whatever manner the consent of Massachusetts may have been
given, or inferred, to the admission of the States already by general
consent forming part of the Union, from such territory, the admission of such States, in the judgment of Massachusetts, forms no precedent for the admission of Texas, and can never be interpreted to
rest on powers granted in the Constitution.
"Resolved, That there has hitherto been no precedent of an admission of a foreign state or foreign territory into the Union by legislation. And as the powers of legislation granted in the Constitution
of the United States to Congress, do not embrace a case of the admission of a foreign state, or foreign territory, by legislation, into
the Union, such an act of admission would have no binding force
whatever on the people of Massachusetts." 3
Thus, Massachusetts, contrary to the prevalent and popular view,
has been as much a champion of the doctrine of nullification as South
Carolina. However, never has Massachusetts in exercising interposi31. MASS. AcTs AND RpsoLv s 1855, p. 924.
32. MASS. AcTs 1804-05, chap. 39, pp. 308-10.
33. Mass. AcTs AND RZSOLMv~ 1845, chap. 39, pp. 598-99.
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tion employed the democratic modes of referendum action or even

of convention action, both of which were used by South Carolina.
In 1858 the General Assembly of the State of Vermont, again
following in the footsteps of Massachusetts, interposed against the
Federal Fugitive Slave Law of September 18, 1850 by enacting a
statute which provided as follows:
"Sect. 6. Every person who may have been held as a slave who
shall come, or be brought into this State, with or without the consent
of his or her master or mistress, or who shall come, or be brought,
or be involuntarily or in any way, in this State shall be free. Sect.
7. Every person who shall hold, or attempt to hold, in this State,
in slavery, or as a slave, any person mentioned as a slave in the sixth
section of this act, or any free person, in any form, or for any time,
however short, under the pretense that such person is or has been a
slave, shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the State prison
for a term not less than one year nor more than fifteen years, and be
fined not exceeding $2,000."34
That the use of federal force against a State interposing against
an act of the Congress would be a gross and palpable usurpation of
power at the hands of the federal authorities is attested to by the
words of James Madison in the federal Constitutional convention,
by the words of Oliver Ellsworth in the ratifying convention of Connecticut, by the words of Alexander Hamilton in the ratifying convention of New York, and by the words of Governor Edmund Randolph in the ratifying convention of Virginia.
Three States came into the Union conditionally; that is, their ratifications of the Constitution each contained a condition subsequent.
These States are Virginia, New York, and Rhode Island. Virginia's
condition subsequent as embodied in her ratification of June 25th,
1788 is in these words:
". .. the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived
from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them, whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression." 3
The foregoing condition subsequent was quoted in Virginia's Ordinance No. 1 (secession) 3 6 as adopted by convention on April 17th,
1861 and ratified by referendum on May 23rd, 1861. When Virginia's constitutional convention passed her ratification containing
this condition subsequent, all but four of the original thirteen States
34. VT. LAws 1858, p. 42.
35. VA. CODE ANN. 1919, vol. 1, p. 132.
36. VA. Acts 1861, appendix, p. 3.
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had previously ratified the Constitution, all without the condition
subsequent that any powers delegated might under certain circumstances be resumed. Since the nine States already members of the
Union accepted Virginia as a member, they assented to Virginia's
condition subsequent. Such assent thereupon operated so as to make
Virginia's condition subsequent apply to each and everyone of the
nine States as forcefully as it applied to Virginia.
The next State to join the Union, New York, also came into the
Union conditionally. New York's condition subsequent, as contained
in her ratification of July 26th, 1788 is in these words:
".... the powers of Government may be reassumed by the people,
whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness."
Since the ten States already members of the Union accepted New
York as a member, they assented to New York's condition subsequent,
which was the same kind of condition subsequent which already applied
to all ten. The next State to enter the Union was North Carolina. The
last of the original thirteen States to join the Union, Rhode Island,
also came into the Union conditionally. Rhode Island's condition
subsequent as embodied in her ratification of May 29th, 1790 contains the same words heretofore quoted from New York's condition
subsequent.
Since the twelve States already members of the Union accepted
Rhode Island as a member, they assented to Rhode Island's condition
subsequent, which was the same kind of condition subsequent as
before.
Each of the remaining thirty-five States was admitted into the
Union on the basis of absolute equality with each of the original
thirteen members. Once admitted to statehood, such equality is guaranteed by the very terms of the Constitution.
Since each of the thirty-five States to enter the Union subsequent
to the original thirteen States came into the Union on a basis of perfect equality with each of the original thirteen States, the condition
sulbsequent applicable to the original thirteen States applies to the
remaining thirty-five States just the same as all rights and powers
possessed by each of the original thirteen are possessed by equal
amounts by each of the remaining thirty-five.
The people of any State, therefore, may reassume the exercise of
powers of Government delegated under the Constitution "whenever it
shall become necessary to their happiness". Thus, the people of any
State may reassume any delegation of the exercise of any power
"whenever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression".
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The people of each State possess this right impliedly by virtue of
the terms of the Constitution37 and expressly by virtue of the conditional ratifications of the Constitution by the Commonwealth of Virginia and the States of New York and Rhode Island.
But since the resumption can be accomplished only by the people
of a State, some higher authority than the State legislature is necessary to decide the question of resumption since members of the State
legislature are representatives of the people of their State in all legislative matters, that is, a State legislature is a general agent of the
people of the State. Members of a convention elected by the people
of a State to decide the one question of resumption would constitute
authority closer to sovereignty, which, of course, resides in the people
of the State themselves. A convention, therefore, is a special agent
of the people of the State. Proof that a convention whose members
are elected by the people of a State is closer to the sovereignty of the
people of the State than a legislature is to be found in the fact that
it is provided in the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union 8
that an amendment to said Articles of Confederation requires the
consent of the legislature of every State which ratified the said
Articles (and all thirteen States eventually ratified); yet only nine
States (Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, and New Hampshire) were
able successfully to amend the said Articles by the device of all but
one (Rhode Island) of the thirteen States. resorting to the remedy
of submitting the question of amendment to authority closer to the
sovereignty of the people of the States than legislatures, namely, conventions, and fixing3 9 the arbitrary number nine as the number of
States whose ratifications by conventions would be necessary for the
adoption of an amended Articles of Confederation styled the Constitution for the United States of America by the nine or more ratifying
members of the twelve States. Thus, violence was not done to the provision of the Articles of Confederation 40 declaring the perpetuity of
the partnership or union thereunder. Only the wording of this perpetuity feature was modified in the amended Articles of Confederation so as to read, "We the people of the United States, in order
to . . . secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,'
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of

37. U. S. CoNsT., TENTH AMEND.
38. U. S. ARTs. OF CoNFED., Art. XIII.
39. U. S. CoNsT., Art. V.
40. U. S. ARrs. OF CONrED., Art. VII.
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America" 4 1 as the word "posterity" from the point of view of time
is equivalent in meaning to the word "perpetual".
Further proof that a convention is closer to the sovereignty of the
people of a State than the legislature thereof is to be seen in the fact
that ratification of all twenty-one of the amendments to the Constitution, with the single exception of the twenty-first amendment, was
by legislatures, but that the ratification of the twenty-first amendment
was proposed by the Congress to be by conventions ostensibly because it was the only proposed amendment ever passed by a resolution of the congress which was designed to amend a preceding amendment and, thus, to vitiate the prior action taken by legislatures in
having ratified the subject matter to be amended.
Because it is provided in the Constitution 42 that ratification by
three-fourths of the States in the Union is necessary for the adoption
of an amendment, some authority even higher than conventions may
be necessary to decide the question of resumption when the States in
issue number less than thirty-six. There is only one authority higher
than a convention

-

the supreme authority

-

sovereignty itself

-

the people of a State themselves! The sovereignty of the people
9f a State themselves as expressed in a referendum conducted in
their State would operate so as to lift the question of resumption
above the Fifth Article. Virginia submitted the affirmative action
taken by her convention on April 17, 1861 on the question of secession to a referendum held on May 23, 1861. Tennessee submitted
on June 8, 1861 the question of secession also to a referendum. And
should the people of a State vote in favor of resumption, an amendment to the Constitution would be effectuated, but would apply only
to the State in issue.
Since sovereignty resides with the people of each State, each State
(that is, the State government, particularly the State legislature) is
the primary agent of the people of each State, will constitute the principal. When the people of each of the original thirteen States assembled, by their representatives in State constitutional conventions,
ratified the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, this act
was analogous to the entering into of articles of general co-partnership; each State was retained by the people thereof as their primary
agent but was to abstain from the exercise of certain powers formerly
held in trust by each State for the people thereof as the result of a
prior delegation of the exercise of such powers to each State by the
people thereof since the exercise of such powers was reassumed by
41. U. S. CoNST., PR ^AmBa.
42. U. S. ARTs. OF CONFED., Art. XIII.
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the people of each State and conferred by delegation to a joint subagent - the federal government.
When the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union for the
United States of America were amended and styled the Constitution
for the United States of America, the federal government, it is true,
was delegated a greater exercise of power by the people of the ratifying States than had been delegated to it under the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union by the people of the ratifying States.
But this increase ihthe exercise of power delegated to the subagent the federal government -was a subtraction of the exercise of power
not from the people of the States but from the States; that is, just
as the people of the States did not delegate any new exercise of power
to the federal government when they, assembled, by their representatives in State constitutional conventions, ratified the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union for the United States of America,
but simply reassumed the exercise of some of the powers previously
delegated to their State Governments and delegated the exercise of
these powers to a subagent, so too did the people of the States delegate no new exercise of power to the federal government when they,
assembled, by their representatives in State constitutional conventions,
ratified the Constitution for the United States of America, but simply
reassumed the exercise of additional powers previously delegated to
their State governments and delegated the exercise of these additional
powers to the subagent.
There has even been interposition by one branch of the federal
government directed against the action taken by another branch of
the same government. The first great example of this was President
Jefferson's displeasure with the Congress for having passed the Sedition Act of July 14, 1798 and his resultant pardoning of all those
convicted under that law. His action, taken because he believed the
Sedition Act to be unconstitutional, might be said to constitute a usurpation of the prerogatives of the judiciary; both State and Federal.
He expressed his motivation implicitly in the following words: "You
seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity of
the sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a
right to decide for the executive, more than to the executive to decide for them. Both magistrates are equally independent in the sphere
of action assigned to them. The judges, believing the law to be constitutional, had a right to pass sentence of fine and imprisonment;
because the power was placed in their hands by the Constitution.
But the executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound
to remit the execution of it; because that power has been confided

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol2/iss3/6

18

Morse:
Doctrines of Nullification
and Secession--A Historical Study
NuLLIFICATION
AND SECESSION
to them by the Constitution. That instrument meant that its coordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion which
gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional,
and what are not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and for the executive also in their spheres,
would make the judiciary a despotic branch". 4 3
"I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution under
the sedition law, because I considered and now consider that law to
'4 4
be a nullity."
President Lincoln interposed against Mr. Chief Justice Taney's decision in Ex Parte Merryman 45 in 1861 by refusing to obey the mandate of a federal court issued by the Chief Justice of the United States
sitting on circuit. Mr. Chief Justice Taney wrote as follows:
"And these great and fundamental laws, which Congress itself
could not suspend, have been disregarded and suspended, like the
writ of habeas corpus, by a military order, supported by force of
arms. Such is the case now before me; and I can only say that if
the authority which the Constitution has confided to the judiciary
department and judicial officers may thus upon any pretext or under
any circumstances, be usurped by the military power at its discretion,
the people of the United States are no longer living under a Government of laws, but every citizen holds life, liberty, and property at the
will and pleasure of the army officer in whose military district he may
happen to be found.
"In such a case my duty was too plain to be mistaken. I have
exercised all the power which the Constitution and laws confer on
me, but that power has been resisted by a force too strong for me
to overcome. It is possible that the officer who had incurred this
grave responsibility may have misunderstood his instructions, and exceeded the authority intended to be given him. I shall therefore
order all the proceedings in this case, with my opinion, to be filed
and recorded in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, and direct the clerk to transmit a copy

. . .

to the

President of the United States. It will then remain for that high officer, in fulfillment of his constitutional obligation to 'take care that
the laws be faithfully executed' to determine what measure he will
take to cause the civil process of the United States to be respected
and enforced."
The Congress and the legislatures of three States in excess of the
43.

561.
IV, p. 556.

JEFFERSON'S COmPLETE WORKS, VOL. IV, p.

44. JFErSON'S COmPL=Z WORKS, vol.

45. 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (1861).
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essential three-quarters interposed against President Johnson's pardoning of former Confederate public officials by writing the third
section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads as follows: "No
person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector
of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United
States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged 'in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to-the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
The Congress interposed against President Johnson's removal of
cabinet officers by passing the Tenure of Office Act of March 2,
1867,46 "...
providing that all officers appointed by and with the
consent of the Senate should hold their offices until their successors
should have in like manner been appointed and qualified, and that
certain heads of departments, including the Secretary of War, should
hold their offices during the term of the President by whom appointed
and one month thereafter subject to removal by consent of the Senate".
This law remained in amended form as late as 1926 when Mr. Chief
Justice Taft in Myers v. United States47 held it to be unconstitutional.

46. 14 U. S.

STAT. AT LARGn

47. 272 U. S. 52, 166 (1926).

430.
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